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Abstract. In this paper we present tractable algorithms for
learning a logical model of actions’ effects and precondi-
tions in deterministic partially observable domains. These
algorithms update a representation of the set of possible ac-
tion models after every observation and action execution. We
show that when actions are known to have no conditional
effects, then the set of possible action models can be rep-
resented compactly indeﬁnitely. We also show that certain
desirable properties hold for actions that have conditional ef-
fects, and that sometimes those can be learned efﬁciently as
well. Our approach takes time and space that are polynomial
in the number of domain features, and it is the ﬁrst exact so-
lution that is tractable for a wide class of problems. It does
so by representing the set of possible action models using
propositional logic, while avoiding general-purpose logical
inference. Learning in partially observable domains is difﬁ-
cult and intractable in general, but our results show that it can
be solved exactly in large domains in which one can assume
some structure for actions’ effects and preconditions. These
results are relevant for more general settings, such as learn-
ing HMMs, reinforcement learning, and learning in partially
observable stochastic domains.
1 Introduction
Agents that act in complex domains usually have limited
prior knowledge of their actions’ preconditions and effects
(the transition model of the world). Such agents need to learn
about these action to act effectively, and they also need to
track the state of the world, when their sensory information
is limited. For example, a robot moving from room to room
in a building can observe only its immediate environment.
Upon discovering a switch in the wall, it may not know the
consequences of ﬂipping this switch. After ﬂipping it, the
agent may observe those effects that occur in its immediate
environment, but not those outside the room. When it leaves
the room and discovers some change in the world, it may
want to ascribe this change to ﬂipping the switch.
Learning transition models in partially observable do-
mains is hard. In stochastic domains, learning transition
models is central to learning Hidden Markov Models
(HMMs) [17] and to reinforcement learning [8], both of
which afford only solutions that are not guaranteed to ap-
proximate the optimal. In HMMs the transition model is
learned using the Baum-Welch algorithm, which is a spe-
cial case of EM. It is a hill-climbing algorithm which is
only guaranteed to reach a local optima, and there is no time
guarantee for convergence on this local optima. Reinforce-
ment learning in partially observable domains [7] can be
solved (approximately) by interleaving learning the POMDP
with solving it (the learning and solving are both approxi-
mate because ﬁnite memory or ﬁnite granularity is always
assumed) [3, 12, 13]. It is important to notice that this prob-
lem is harder than solving POMDPs. In some cases, one can
solve the POMDP with some guarantee for relatively fast
convergence and approximation, if one knows the underlying
transition model [9, 14]. Also, in deterministic cases, com-
puting the optimal undiscounted inﬁnite horizon policy in
(known) POMDPs is PSPACE-hard (NP-complete if a poly-
nomial horizon) in the number of states [11], but reinforce-
ment learning has no similar solution known to us.
In this paper we present a formal, exact, many times
tractable, solution to the problem of simultaneously learn-
ing and ﬁltering (SLAF) preconditions and effects of actions
from experiences in partially observable domains. We put
emphasis on the solution being tractable as a function of the
numberofstatefeaturesratherthanthe(exponentiallylarger)
number of states.
First, we present a formal system that captures this prob-
lem precisely for possibly nondeterministic actions. It main-
tains a set of pairs  state,transition-relation  that are consis-
tent with the actions and observations collected so far (the
transition belief state). Then, we present a generic algorithm
that uses logical deduction and learns transition models in
deterministic partially observable domains.
We present more tractable algorithms for special cases of
SLAF. We examine actions that are (1) always executable
or sometimes inexecutable (depending on deterministic pre-
conditions),and(2)conditionalornonconditional(whenever
executable, have the same effect). For the case of STRIPS ac-
tions (always executable, nonconditional) we show that our
algorithm runs in time linear in the number of propositional
domain features and the space taken to represent our transi-
tion belief state. We can maintain this transition belief state
in polynomial space (in the number of features and actions
available in our domain) under very relaxed conditions. We
present a more general algorithm (than our STRIPS one) that
treats other cases with a polynomial time per time step, when
actions are known to act as 1:1 mapping on states, and they
provide an approximation otherwise.
Our algorithms are the ﬁrst to learn exact action models
in partially observable domains. They are also ﬁrst to ﬁnd
an action model at the same time that they determine the
agent’s knowledge about the state of the world. They draw
on intuitions and results of [1] for known (nondeterministic)
action models. If we assume that our transition model is fully
known, then our results reduce to those of [1] for determin-
istic actions.A wide range of virtual domains satisfy our assumptions
of determinism and structured actions, and we are in the pro-
cess of testing our algorithms in large domains, including
over 1000 features (see [6] for current progress).
Previous work on learning action’s effects and precon-
ditions focused on fully observable domains. [5, 19] learn
STRIPS actions with parameters by ﬁnding the most gen-
eral and most speciﬁc in a version space of STRIPS oper-
ators. [15] uses a general-purpose classiﬁcation system (in
their case, MSDD) to learn the effects and preconditions of
actions, identifying irrelevant variables. [2] presents an ap-
proach that is based on inductive logic programming. Most
recently, [16] showed how to learn stochastic actions with no
conditional effects (i.e., the same stochastic change occurs at
every state in which the action is executable). The common
theme among these approaches is their assumption that the
state of the world is fully observed at any point in time. [18]
is the only work that considers partial observability, and it
does so by assuming that the world is fully observable, giv-
ing approximate computation in relevant domains.
2 Filtering Transition Relations
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Figure 1. Two rooms and ﬂipping the light switch
Consider a simple world with two rooms, one with a
switch, and the other with a light bulb whose state can be
observed only when the agent is in that room (see Figure
1). Assume that our agent initially knows nothing about the
three actions go-E (go to the Eastern room), go-W (go to the
Western room), and sw-on (ﬂip the switch to on). Our agent’s
problem is to determine the effects of these actions (to the ex-
tent that it can, theoretically), while also tracking the world.
We describe the combined problem of ﬁltering (updating
the agent’s belief state) and learning the transition model for-
mally. A transition system is a tuple  P,S,A,R , where
• P is a ﬁnite set of propositional ﬂuents;
• S ⊆ Pow(P) is the set of world states;
• A is a ﬁnite set of actions;
• R ⊆ S × A × S is the transition relation.
Here, a world state, s ∈ S, is a subset of P that contains
propositionstrueinthisstate,andR(s,a,s
′)meansthatstate
s
′ is a possible result of action a in state s.
A transition belief state is a set of tuples  s,R  where s is
a state and R a transition relation. LetR = Pow(S×A×S)
be the set of all possible transition relations on S,A. Let
S = S ×R. Every ρ ⊆ S is a transition belief state. When
we hold a a transition belief state ρ we consider every tu-
ple  s,R  ∈ ρ possible. With this formal system we assume
that observations are given to us (if at all) as logical sen-
tences after performing an action. They are either state for-
mulae (propositional combinations of ﬂuent names) or OK
or ¬OK (observing the action is possible or impossible to
execute). We denote the former kind of observation with o,
and the latter with OK,¬OK, respectively.
Deﬁnition 1 (Transition Filtering Semantics) Let ρ ⊆ S
be a transition belief state. The ﬁltering of ρ with actions
and observations  a1,o1,...,at,ot  is
1. Filter[ǫ](ρ) = ρ;
2. Filter[a,OK](ρ) =
{ s
′,R  |  s,a,s
′  ∈ R,  s,R  ∈ ρ};
3. Filter[a,¬OK](ρ) =
{ s,R  |  s,R  ∈ ρ, ∀s
′ ∈ S  s,a,s
′  / ∈ R};
4. Filter[o](ρ) = { s,R  ∈ ρ | o is true in s};
5. Filter[ ai,oi,...,at,ot ](ρ) =
Filter[ ai+1,oi+1,...,at,ot ]
(Filter[oi](Filter[ai](ρ))).
We call Step 2 progression with a, Step 3 disqualifying a, and
Step 4 ﬁltering with o.
The intuition behind this deﬁnition is that every transition
relation, R, and initial state, s, produce a set of state-relation
pairs { si,R }i∈I in the result of an action. If an observa-
tion discards some state si, the pair  si,R  is removed from
this set. We conclude that R is not possible when all pairs
including it are removed from the set.
A nondeterministic domain description D is a ﬁnite set
of transition rules of the form “a causes F if G” which de-
scribe the effects of actions, for F and G propositional state
formulae. We say that F is the head and G is the tail of those
rules. When G ≡ TRUE we write “a causes F”.
The semantics of a domain description that we choose is
compatible with the standard semantics belief update oper-
ator of [20]. We deﬁne it below by ﬁrst completing the de-
scription and then mapping the completed description to a
transition relation.
For domain description D we deﬁne a transition system
with PD and AD the sets of propositional ﬂuents and actions
mentioned in D, respectively. For action a and ﬂuent f, let
GD(a,f) =
 
{G | “a causes F if G” ∈ D, f ∈ L(F)},
a disjunction of the preconditions of rules that possibly affect
ﬂuent f (an empty disjunction is equivalent to FALSE). We
use “a keeps f if G” as a shorthand for the rules “a causes f
if f∧G” and “a causes ¬f if ¬f∧G”. It designates the non-
effects of action a. Deﬁne Comp(D), the completion of D
Comp(D) = D ∪ {“a keeps f if ¬GD(a,f)” |
a ∈ A,f ∈ P, GD(a,f)  ≡ TRUE}.
This deﬁnition is well behaved, in the sense that
Comp(D) = Comp(D ∪ D
′), if D
′ ⊆ Comp(D).
Let FD(a,s) = {F | “a causes F if G” ∈ D, s |= G},
the set of effects of a in s, according to D. D deﬁnes a tran-
sition relation RD as follows
RD = { s,a,s
′  | s,s
′ ∈ S, a ∈ A, s
′ |= FD(a,s)} (1)
When there is no confusion, we write R for RD. We say
that two domain descriptions D1,D2 are equivalent (D1 ≡
D2), if RD1 = RD2. D is a complete domain description, if
RD = RComp(D). In that case we say that R is completely
deﬁned by D.Time step 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Action go-W sw-on go-E sw-on go-W go-E
Location E ¬E ¬E E E ¬E E
Bulb ? ¬lit ¬lit ? ? lit ?
Switch ¬sw ? ? ¬sw sw ? sw
Possible OK ¬OK OK OK OK OK
Figure 2. An action-observation sequence (table entries are observations). Legend: E: east; ¬E: west; lit: light is on; ¬lit: light is off; sw:
switch is on; ¬sw: switch is off; OK: action executable; ¬OK: action not executable.
Example 2 Consider the scenario of Figure 2 and assume
that actions are deterministic, unconditional, and always ex-
ecutable(assumingnoactionwasperformedatstep2).Then,
every action affects every ﬂuent either negatively, positively,
or not at all. Consequently, every transition relation R is
completely deﬁned by some D such that (viewing a tuple as
a set of its elements)
D ∈
 
a∈



go-W
go-E
sw-on



 
a causes E,
a causes ¬E
a keeps E
 
×
  a causes sw,
a causes ¬sw
a keeps sw
 
×
 
a causes lit,
a causes ¬lit
a keeps lit
 
Say that initially we know the effects of go-E, go-W, but do
not know what sw-on does. Then, transition ﬁltering starts
with the product set of R (of 27 possible relations) and all
possible2
3 states.Also, at time step 4 we know that the world
state is exactly {E,¬lit,¬sw}. We try sw-on and get that
Filter[sw-on](ρ4) includes the same set of transition rela-
tions but with each of those transition relations projecting
the state {E,¬lit,¬sw} to an appropriate choice from S.
When we receive the observations o5 = ¬E ∧ ¬sw of time
step 5, ρ5 = Filter[o5](Filter[sw-on](ρ4)) removes from
the transition belief state all the relations that gave rise to
¬E or to ¬sw. We are left with transition relations satisfy-
ing one of the tuples in
  sw-on causes E,
sw-on keeps E
 
×{ sw-on causes sw }×
 
sw-on causes lit
sw-on causes ¬lit
sw-on keeps lit
 
Finally, when we perform action go-W, again we update
the set of states associated with every transition relation in
the set of pairs ρ5. When we receive the observations of time
step 6, we conclude ρ6 = Filter[o6](Filter[go-W](ρ5)) =



  
¬E
lit
sw
 
,



sw-on causes E,
sw-on causes sw,
sw-on causes lit,
go-E...



 
,
  
¬E
lit
sw
 
,



sw-on keeps E,
sw-on causes sw,
sw-on causes lit,
go-E...



 


(2)
SLAF reduces to ﬁltering (updating the agent’s belief
state) [1, 20, 10] when the transition model is fully speciﬁed.
Theorem 3 Let ρ = σ × {R}, where σ ⊆ S and R ⊆ S ×
A × S, and let  ai,oi i≤t be a sequence of actions and ob-
servations. If FilterR[ ai,oi i≤t](σ) is the belief-state ﬁl-
tering
1 of σ with  ai,oi i≤t, then Filter[ ai,oi i≤t](ρ) =
FilterR[ ai,oi i≤t](σ) × {R}.
3 Logical Filtering of Transition Models
The example in the previous section illustrates how the ex-
plicit representation of transition belief states may be doubly
exponentialinthenumberofdomainfeaturesandthenumber
1 Filtering semantics as deﬁned in [1].
of actions. In this section we follow the intuition that propo-
sitional logic can serve to represents ρ more compactly. From
here forth we assume that our actions are deterministic.
In the following, for a set of propositional formulae, Ψ,
L(Ψ) is the signature of Ψ, i.e., the set of propositional sym-
bols that appear in Ψ. L(Ψ) is the language of Ψ, i.e., the set
of formulae built with L(Ψ). Similarly, L(L) is the language
of L, for a set of symbols L.
3.1 Representing Transition Belief States
We deﬁne a propositional logical language that allows us to
represent sets of domain descriptions (thus, sets of transi-
tion relations). Let P1,P2 ⊆ L(P) be sets of state formulae
such that P1 includes only literals or FALSE, P2 includes
only terms (conjunctions of literals) that are not equivalent to
FALSE, and for all ϕ,ψ ∈ P1 ∪ P2, if ϕ ≡ ψ, then ϕ = ψ
or ϕ ≡ TRUE. We deﬁne a propositional vocabulary
L(P1,P2) = {a
F
G | a ∈ A, F ∈ P1, G ∈ P2}.
Theorem 4 For every rule r =“a causes F if G”, for F,G
state formulae, there is a set of transition rules TR = {“a
causes li if ti”}i∈I, with a set of indices I, terms ti, and
literals li, such that r ≡ TR (i.e., we can exchange r for
TR, and get an equivalent domain description).
IntherestofthispaperweimplicitlyassumethatP1,P2 ⊆
L(P) are sets of state formulae as above. Also, D is a com-
plete domain description with effects in P1 and preconditions
in P2. We also assume that if ¬∃s
′RD(s,a,s
′) for some
s ∈ S,a ∈ A, then there is a rule “a causes FALSE if G”
such that s |= G.
For set of formulae P2 we deﬁne Bottom(P2) = {G ∈
P2 | G  ≡ FALSE, ∀G
′ ∈ P2 [(G
′ |= G) ∧ (G
′  ≡
FALSE)] ⇒ G = G
′}, i.e., Bottom(P2) is the set of
strongest preconditions in P2.
Deﬁnition 5 We deﬁne the theory
T
L
D = rulesD ∧ implied-weaker-rules∧
implied-stronger-rules ∧ exec-precondsD
(3)rulesD = {a
F
G ∈ L | “a causes F if G” ∈ D}
implied-weaker-rules =
 
F ∈ P1
G,G
′ ∈ P2
a ∈ A
(a
F
G′ ∧ (G ⇒ G
′) ⇒ a
F
G)
implied-stronger-rules =
 
F ∈ P1
G,G
′,G
′′ ∈ P2
G
′′ ≡ G ∨ G
′
a ∈ A
(a
F
G ∧ a
F
G′ ⇒ a
F
G′′) ∧
 
F,F
′,F
′′ ∈ P1
F
′′ ≡ F ∧ F
′
G ∈ P2
a ∈ A
(a
F
G ∧ a
F′
G ⇒ a
F′′
G )
exec-precondsD =
{¬a
FALSE
G ∈ L | G ∈ Bottom(P2),
∀G
′ ∈ P2 ((G |= G
′) ⇒ “a causes FALSE if G
′” / ∈ D)}.
The intention is that a
F
G ∈ L is true in T
L
D exactly when “a
causes F if G” is in D or there is a stronger transition rule
“a causes F
′ if G
′” in D.
The following theorem shows how we can represent deter-
ministic transition relations (with conditional effects) using
only the positive causality statements
2.
Theorem 6 (Representing Deterministic Actions) 1. TD
is a complete theory
2. If TD |= a
F
G, then for every s,s
′, if RD(s,a,s
′) and s |=
G, then s
′ |= F.
3. If TD |= ¬a
F
G, then there are s,s
′ such that RD(s,a,s
′)
and s |= G, s
′ |= ¬F.
Consequently, for every pair of complete domain descrip-
tions D1,D2, D1 ≡ D2 iff TD1 ≡ TD2. Thus, every transi-
tion relation R has a unique theory TD and every theory de-
ﬁnes a unique transition relation. (We write TR for the theory
representing transition relation R.)
Corollary 7 (Always-Executable, Deterministic) If in D
all actions are always executable, then
3 exec-preconds =
{¬a
FALSE
G | a ∈ A, G ∈ Bottom(P2)} and
TD ≡ rulesD ∧ exec-preconds ∧  
F ∈ P1
G,G
′ ∈ P2
a ∈ A
(a
F
G′ ∧ (G ⇒ G
′) ⇒ a
F
G) ∧
 
F ∈ P1
G ∈ P2
a ∈ A
¬(a
F
G ∧ a
¬F
G ) ∧
 
F ∈ P1
G,G
′,G
′′ ∈ P2
G
′′ ≡ G ∨ G
′
a ∈ A
(a
F
G ∧ a
F
G′ ⇒ a
F
G′′)
Deﬁne a
f◦ = a
f
f ∧ a
¬f
¬f.
Corollary 8 (Unconditional, Always-Exec., Deterministic)
Let P2 = {TRUE}, and assume that D possibly includes
sentences of the form “a keeps F”, and no sentences of the
form “a causes FALSE”. Then,
TD ≡ rulesD ∧
 
f∈P,a∈A
(a
f ¯ ∨a
¬f ¯ ∨a
f◦).
We encode sets of domain descriptions as follows: For a
set R ⊂ P(S × A × S) let
4 TR =
 
R∈R TR. For a tuple
 s,R , s ∈ S, we deﬁne T s,R  = TR ∧ s. Finally, for a
transition belief state, ρ, we deﬁne Tρ =
 
 s,R ∈ρ T s,R .
2 At present it is not clear to the author how one can observe non-
causality in nondeterministic settings.
3 D is omitted as a subscript because it is not relevant.
4 We assume that the set of ﬂuents P is ﬁnite.
Example 9 Consider ρ6 from Example 2 (equation 2).
There, we considered only deterministic, same-effect,
always-executable actions. We take P1 to include only unit
clauses, and P2 = {TRUE}. We can write ρ6 using a logi-
cal formula that is satisﬁed only by the tuples in ρ6:
Tρ6 ≡
 
¬E∧
sw∧
lit
 
 
 
go-W
¬E∧
go-W
sw◦∧
go-Wlit◦
 
 
 
go-E
E∧
go-E
sw◦∧
go-Elit◦
 
 
 
(sw-on
E ∨ sw-on
E◦)∧
sw-on
sw∧
sw-onlit
 
∧
 
f∈P,a∈A(a
f ¯ ∨a
¬f ¯ ∨a
f◦)
Notice that, e.g., ¬go-E
¬E and ¬go-E
E◦ are logical conse-
quences of Tρ6.
The same way allows us to represent a much larger set of
transition relations. For example, in the previous section we
avoided listing the contents of the set of tuples ρ0 because it
was too large (27 possible relations cross-combined with all
2
3 world states). Now we can write it simply as follows:
 
go-W
¬E
go-W
sw◦
go-Wlit◦
 
∧
 
go-E
E∧
go-E
sw◦∧
go-Elit◦
 
∧
 
(sw-on
E ∨ sw-on
¬E ∨ sw-on
E◦)∧
(sw-on
sw ∨ sw-on
¬sw ∨ sw-on
sw◦)∧
(sw-on
lit ∨ sw-on
¬lit ∨ sw-on
lit◦)
 
∧
 
f∈P,a∈A(a
f ¯ ∨a
¬f ¯ ∨a
f◦)
Thus, we can represent a transition belief state, ρ, with a
logical formula, ϕ, over the propositional state ﬂuents and
the propositional symbols for effect sentences. ϕ represents
the set of tuples  s,R  that satisfy it. We call this logical
representationatransitionbeliefformula.Itfollowsthatϕ |=
base, if we take base to be the subformula of TD that is not
rulesD in the appropriate case of Corollaries 7, 8 because
base is independent of D in those cases.
3.2 Filtering Logical Action Models
For a deterministic (possibly conditional) action, a, deﬁne
the effect model of a for time t to be
Teff(a,t) =
 
l∈P1,G∈P2((at ∧ a
l
G ∧ Gt) ⇒ lt+1) ∧  
l∈P1(lt+1 ∧ at ⇒ (
 
G∈P2(a
l
G ∧ Gt)))
(4)
where at is a propositional symbol asserting that action a
occurred at time t, and we use the convention that ϕt =
ϕ[P/Pt], i.e., ϕt is the result of replacing every propositional
symbol of ϕ with the same propositional symbol that now
has an added subscript, t. The ﬁrst part of the conjunction is
the assertion that if a executes at time t, and it causes l, if
G holds, and G holds at time t, then l holds at time t + 1.
The second part of the conjunction says that l is true at time
t + 1 after a’s execution only if a has an effect l conditional
on some G, and this G is true at time t.
For an always-executable, non-conditional action, a, we
get a simpler formula
Teff(a,t) ≡
 
l∈P1((at ∧ (a
l ∨ (a
l
l ∧ lt)) ⇒ lt+1) ∧  
l∈P1(lt+1 ∧ at ⇒ (a
l ∨ (a
l
l ∧ lt)))
Deﬁnition 10 (Logical Transition Filtering)
Progression: Filter[a](ϕ) = Cn
Lt+1(ϕt∧at∧Teff(a,t))
Filtering: Filter[o](ϕ) = ϕ ∧ oThus, Filter[a](ϕ) is the set of consequences of ϕt in the
vocabulary Lt+1 = Pt+1 ∪ L, the vocabulary that includes
only ﬂuents of time t + 1 and effect propositions from L.
The following theorem shows that ﬁltering a transition belief
formula is equivalent to ﬁltering a transition belief state.
Theorem 11 For ϕ transition belief formula, a action,
Filter[a]({ s,R  ∈ S |  s,R  satisﬁes ϕ}) =
{ s,R  ∈ S |  s,R  satisﬁes Filter[a](ϕ)}
3.3 Distribution Properties
Several distribution properties always hold for ﬁltering of
transition belief states (or formulae). The ﬁrst one follows
from set theoretical considerations. 11.
Corollary 12 For ϕ,ψ transition belief formulae, a action,
1. Filter[a](ϕ ∨ ψ) ≡ Filter[a](ϕ) ∨ Filter[a](ψ)
2. |= Filter[a](ϕ ∧ ψ) ⇒ Filter[a](ϕ) ∧ Filter[a](ψ)
Stronger properties hold if ﬁltering an action is a 1:1 map-
ping between state-transition-relation pairs.
Corollary 13 Let a be an action, and ϕ,ψ be transition be-
lief formulae. Then, Filter[a](ϕ ∧ ψ) ≡ Filter[a](ϕ) ∧
Filter[a](ψ), if
1. For every transition relation R possible with ϕ ∨ ψ, a
maps states in {s |  s,R  |= ϕ} 1:1 to states in S, or
2. Whenever  s1,R  |= ϕ ∨ ψ,  s2,R  |= ϕ ∨ ψ, then
s1 = s2.
Corollary 14 For action a, state s ∈ S, and ϕ,ψ transition
belief formulae,
Filter[a](s∧ϕ∧ψ) ≡ Filter[a](s∧ϕ)∧Filter[a](s∧ψ)
This last corollary explains the relationship between learn-
ing in fully observable and partially observable worlds. Our
algorithms for learning world models will be more tractable
when our agent observes more of the environment. We see
in Section 4 that polynomial-time algorithms exist for SLAF
when ﬁltering distributes over conjunctions.
Finally, when Teff(a,t) ≡ T
1 ∧ T
2 and ϕ ≡ ϕ
1 ∧ ϕ
2,
such that L(T
1) ∩ L(T
2) = ∅ and L(ϕ
i) ⊆ L(T
i), for
i ∈ {1,2}, then the ﬁltering factors into ﬁltering of ϕ
1,ϕ
2
separately. More generally, the following holds.
Theorem 15 Let a be an action, let s ∈ S be a state, let P1
include literals in P and FALSE, let P
i
2 (i ∈ {1,2}) include
clauses in P
i such that L(P) = L(P
1)˙ ∪L(P
2), and let
ϕ
i ∈ L(L(P1,P
i
2) ∪ P) (i ∈ {1,2}) be transition belief
formulae. Then,
Filter[a](ϕ ∧ ψ) ≡ Filter[a](ϕ) ∧ Filter[a](ψ)
4 Factored Learning and Filtering
Learning world models is easier when ﬁltering dis-
tributes over logical connectives. The computation becomes
tractable, with the bottleneck being the time to ﬁlter each part
separately. Figure 3 presents an algorithm for SLAF using
this observation. Filtering of a single ﬂuent (done in function
Fluent-SLAF) and more efﬁcient solutions are the focus of
the rest of this section.
PROCEDURE Factored-SLAF( ai,oi 0<i≤t,ϕ)
∀i, ai action, oi observation, ϕ transition belief formula.
1. For i from 1 to t do,
(a) Set ϕ ← Step-SLAF(oi,ai,ϕ).
(b) Eliminate subsumed clauses in ϕ.
2. Return ϕ.
PROCEDURE Step-SLAF(o,a,ϕ)
o an observation sentence (conjunction of literals), a an
action, ϕ a transition belief formula.
1. If ϕ is a literal, then return o∧Fluent-SLAF(o,a,ϕ).
2. If ϕ = ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2, return Step-SLAF(o,a,ϕ1)∧Step-
SLAF(o,a,ϕ2).
3. If ϕ = ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2, return Step-SLAF(o,a,ϕ1)∨Step-
SLAF(o,a,ϕ2).
PROCEDURE Fluent-SLAF(o,a,ϕ)
o an observation sentence (conjunction of literals), a an
action, ϕ a ﬂuent.
1. Return Cn
Lt+1(ϕt ∧ at ∧ Teff(a,t)).
Figure 3. SLAF using distribution over ∧,∨
4.1 Always-Executable STRIPS Actions
STRIPS actions [4] are deterministic and unconditional (but
sometimes not executable). In this section we examine them
with the assumption that our they always executable. We re-
turn to inexecutability in Section 4.2.
Let Lf = {f} ∪ {a
f,a
¬f,a
f◦ | a ∈ A} be the propo-
sitional vocabulary including only the propositional ﬂuent
symbol f and effect propositions mentioning f. We say
that ϕ is a ﬂuent-factored transition belief formula, if ϕ =
base ∧
 
f∈P ϕf, with L(ϕf) ⊆ Lf. When a transition be-
lief formula ϕ is ﬂuent-factored, then the result of ﬁltering is
also a ﬂuent-factored formula.
Theorem 16 Let ϕ = base ∧
 
f∈P ϕf be a ﬂuent-factored
transition belief formula, with L(ϕf) ⊆ Lf. Then,
Filter[a](ϕ) ≡ base ∧
 
f∈P
Filter[a](ϕf)
and L(Filter[a](ϕf)) ⊆ Lf. Also, if o is a conjunction of
literals, then Filter[o](ϕ) is ﬂuent-factored.
We are left with the problem of ﬁltering each ϕf with a
and o. Let L
0
f = Lf \ {f}.
Theorem 17 Let ϕf be a transition belief formula with
L(ϕf) ⊆ Lf. Then,
Filter[a](ϕf) ≡ (f ⇒ (a
f ∨ ((ϕf ⇒ f) ∧ a
f◦)))∧
(¬f ⇒ (a
¬f ∨ ((ϕf ⇒ ¬f) ∧ a
f◦)))∧
Cn(ϕf) ∩ L(L
0
f)
We can compute Cn(ϕf) ∩ L(L
0
f) without general-
purpose automated deduction, if we keep ϕf in a the fol-
lowing form
(¬f ∨ explf) ∧ (f ∨ expl¬f) ∧ ξf
where explf, expl¬f, and ξf are in L(L
0
f). Every formula
in L(Lf) is logically equivalent to a formula in this form,PROCEDURE AE-STRIPS-SLAF( ai,oi 0<i≤t,ϕ)
∀i, ai an action, oi an observation, ϕ =
 
f∈P ϕf a ﬂuent-
factored transition belief formula.
1. For i from 1 to t do,
(a) Setϕ ←
 
f∈P AE-STRIPS-Fluent-SLAF(oi,ai,ϕf).
(b) Eliminate subsumed clauses in ϕ.
2. Return ϕ.
PROCEDURE AE-STRIPS-Fluent-SLAF(o,a,ϕ)
o conjunction of literals, a action, ϕ = (¬f ∨explf)∧(f ∨
expl¬f) ∧ ξf in f-free form.
1. Set expl
′
f = a
f ∨ (a
f◦ ∧ explf)).
2. Set expl
′
¬f = a¬f ∨ (a
f◦ ∧ expl¬f)).
3. If f does not appear (positively or negatively) in o, then
set ξ
′
f = ξf.
4. Else, if o |= f (we observed f), then
(a) Set ξ
′
f ← ξf ∧ expl
′
f.
(b) Set expl
′
f ← TRUE and expl
′
¬f ← FALSE.
5. Else (we observed ¬f),
(a) Set ξ
′
f ← ξf ∧ expl
′
¬f.
(b) Set expl
′
f = FALSE and expl
′
¬f = TRUE.
6. Return (¬f ∨ expl
′
f) ∧ (f ∨ expl
′
¬f) ∧ ξ
′
f
Figure 4. SLAF with always-executable STRIPS.
which we call f-free form. Figure 4 presents a complete al-
gorithm for SLAF using this observation and form.
Now, we examine the size of the formula that results from
ﬁltering. A transition belief formula ϕ in CNF is in f-k-CNF
if every clause mentioning f or ¬f has at most k literals. For
example, f ∨a
f is in f-2-CNF, but a
f
1 ∨a
¬f
2 is in f-0-CNF.
We alsosaythata,odetermine f inϕifϕ |= a
f orϕ |= a
¬f
or o |= f or o |= ¬f.
Corollary 18 Let ϕ =
 
f∈P ϕf be a ﬂuent-factored
transition belief formula, and o a conjunction of lit-
erals. Then, Procedure AE-STRIPS-SLAF( a,o , ϕ) re-
turns a ﬂuent-factored transition belief formula ϕ
′ ≡
Filter[o](Filter[a](ϕ)) in time O(|ϕ|). Further, if ϕ is in
f-k-CNF and ϕ,a,o determine f, then ϕ
′ is in f-1-CNF.
Otherwise, ϕ
′ is in f-(k + 1)-CNF.
Thus, our transition belief formula remains compact, if we
know the effect of our action on a in ϕ, or we observe f
frequently enough. For example, if we observe every ﬂuent
every 4 actions, then our transition belief state is always in
5-CNF, meaning that it is of size at most O(n   m
5) for n
ﬂuents and m actions (this is much better than the worst case
which can be doubly-exponential in n,m).
4.2 STRIPS Actions
Assume that we allow actions to fail but we always
observe such success and inexecutability. In both exe-
cutable/inexecutable cases we learn something about the ex-
ecutability of the action under consideration. Unfortunately,
this prevents factoring for the general case of actions, unless
one of the conditions of section 3.3 holds. In the rest of this
section we assume that either one of those conditions holds,
or we accept the approximation offered by Corollary 12. De-
ﬁne
a
l
e ≡
 
G∈Bottom(P2)(¬a
FALSE
G ⇒ a
l
G)
a
l◦
e ≡
 
G∈Bottom(P2)(¬a
FALSE
G ⇒ a
l◦
G)
Let B(a) ≡
 
l∈P1(a
l
e ⇒ lt+1) ∧ base.
Corollary 19 (STRIPS-SLAF of a literal) Letl bealiteral
in L(P1,P2) and a an action. If l ∈ P1, then
Filter[a,OK](l) ≡ (lt+1 ⇔ (a
l
e ∨ a
l◦
e )) ∧ ¬a
FALSE
l ∧ B(a)
Filter[a,¬OK](l) ≡ lt+1 ∧ a
failed
l ∧ base
If l / ∈ P1 (i.e., l is an effect literal), then
Filter[a,OK](l) ≡ l ∧ ¬a
FALSE
TRUE ∧ B(a)
Filter[a,¬OK](l) ≡ l ∧ a
failed
TRUE ∧ base
Now we replace Procedure Fluent-SLAF in Figure 3 with
Procedure STRIPS-Fluent-SLAF of Figure 5.
PROCEDURE STRIPS-Fluent-SLAF(o,a,ϕ)
o conjunction of literals, a action, ϕ ﬂuent.
1. If l ∈ P1, then
(a) If o |= OK, then return
(lt+1 ⇐⇒ (a
l
e ∨ a
l◦
e )) ∧ ¬a
FALSE
l ∧ B(a).
(b) (o |= ¬OK) Return lt+1 ∧ a
failed
l ∧ base.
2. (l ∈ P1) If o |= OK, then return l∧¬a
FALSE
TRUE ∧B(a).
3. Return l ∧ a
failed
TRUE ∧ base.
Figure 5. SLAF with STRIPS actions, observing success/failure.
4.3 Conditional Effects
A similar formula to the one above holds for the general case
of deterministic actions (possibly conditional). We assume
thatahaspreconditionsusingthepropositionsin{l
1,...,l
k}.
Theorem 20 Filtering for a literal l ∈ P1 satisﬁes
Filter[a,OK](l) ≡ (l
e
t+1 ⇒
 
G ∈ Bottom(P2,{l
1,...,l
k})
G |= l
p
(a
le
G ∧
 
j≤k((a
lj
G ⇒ l
j
t+1)∧
(a
¬lj
G ⇒ ¬l
j
t+1))))
5 Conclusions
We presented general principles and algorithms for learning
and ﬁltering in partially observable domains. Some of our re-
sults guarantee polynomial-time ﬁltering of transition belief
states indeﬁnitely. In particular, STRIPS domains in which
actions are always executable (or when the preconditions for
those actions are known) can be learned in polynomial time,
if ﬂuents are observed frequently enough.
We expect our algorithms to generalize to action schemas,
where actions are parametrized in various ways (e.g., objects
on which they operate, and numbers that modify the extent
of the action). We plan to explore this direction in the future,
as well as extending this work to agents that have a prior dis-
tribution, knowledge, or preference over the possible worlds
or the actions’ effects.REFERENCES
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